Shahed-136

Iran Aviation Industries Organization · Iran · first flew 2021 · reconnaissance aircraft

The Shahed-136 is an Iranian one-way attack drone — a loitering munition rather than a recoverable aircraft — carrying a warhead to a GPS-designated target before detonating. It is not a reconnaissance platform in the conventional sense but is catalogued here under that role as the closest available category for autonomous aerial systems.

Recognition (WEFT)

W — WingsMid-mounted, delta
E — Engines1 × piston, fuselage-mounted
F — Fuselage3.5 m fuselage
T — TailNo tailplane

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A very small delta-wing airframe roughly the size of a large model aircraft, with a single pusher piston engine at the rear generating a characteristic buzzing sound. Identical to a cruise missile in profile but far simpler. The sawtooth delta trailing edge is visible at close range.

Specifications

Figures are for the representative variant described above; marks differ. See how AircraftIQ sources figures.

History

Iran unveiled the Shahed-136 in 2021. From late 2022 it was supplied to Russia in large numbers and used extensively in attacks on Ukrainian cities, power infrastructure and military targets, making it one of the most-discussed weapons of the war. Russia designates it the Geran-2. It achieved notoriety for its low cost — reportedly a few tens of thousands of dollars per unit — and the difficulty of intercepting large salvoes.

Variants

The baseline Shahed-136 is the principal production form. A maritime variant with a pontoon-fitted version for sea-launched attacks has been reported, and Iran has displayed modified versions with different warhead fits.

Where you'll see it

Used by Iranian proxy forces and supplied to Russia for operational use in Ukraine. Launched in mass salvoes, it has caused significant civilian casualties and infrastructure damage across Ukraine.

In depth

The delta planform is the single most consequential design decision, and it flows directly from the mission. A one-way attack drone needs to carry a fixed payload over hundreds of kilometres, launch from a simple truck-mounted rail, and remain controllable at low speed on descent — but it never has to land, manoeuvre hard, or serve a pilot. A tailless delta answers all of this economically: the long root chord generates useful lift at modest speed, the swept leading edge keeps the aerodynamic centre stable across a wide angle-of-attack range, and eliminating a separate horizontal tail removes structure, control linkages, and cost. Control comes from elevons on the trailing edge, which is why the trailing edge carries the distinctive stepped, sawtooth outline — the steps mark the hinge lines and the transition between the fixed structure and the moving surfaces. A delta also packs the fuselage volume forward, leaving the broad wing to double as a fuel tank, which is how so small an airframe reaches its advertised range.

Propulsion reflects the same logic of cheapness and availability over performance. The type is powered by a small four-cylinder piston engine driving a two-blade pusher propeller — reporting has repeatedly identified it as a Mado MD550, itself a close copy of the German Limbach L550 aero engine. A piston engine of this class is slow and thirsty by military standards, but it is dramatically cheaper than any turbine, can be built or sourced from the light-aviation and UAV hobby supply chain, and needs no exotic fuels or metallurgy. Its exhaust is cool and its infrared signature modest, which slightly complicates heat-seeking interception, though the propeller and engine together produce the characteristic droning buzz that has become the drone's acoustic signature over cities. Guidance is deliberately minimal: a pre-programmed GPS route flown by an inertial navigation unit, with commercial satellite-navigation antennas visible on recovered airframes. There is no datalink, no operator in the loop, no terminal seeker on the baseline version — the target coordinates are loaded before launch and the aircraft simply flies to them. This makes it jam-degradable but also cheap, deniable, and impossible to recall.

The interception problem is a product of these same traits rather than any sophistication. The airframe is small, largely non-metallic in its skin, and flies a low, straight profile that hides it in ground clutter and shortens the horizon at which radar and defenders detect it. It is slow — well below jet speeds — which sounds like an advantage for defenders but instead means it can be launched in large synchronised salvoes designed to saturate a defended area, forcing crews to expend expensive interceptors against very cheap targets. Air defences have adapted by pushing the engagement down to the cheapest effective layer: radar-directed anti-aircraft guns such as the ZSU-23 and towed twin-23mm mounts, shoulder-fired MANPADS, mobile fire teams with heavy machine guns and searchlights, and networked acoustic and optical sensors to cue them. Western systems supplied to Ukraine have been retasked or reprogrammed to prioritise these slow low-flyers, and the economic mismatch — a five-figure drone against a six- or seven-figure missile — is itself part of the weapon's design intent.

For identification, fix on proportions and detail. The airframe is roughly the size of a large man, with a wingspan near two and a half metres and a pure triangular plan seen from above; the nose is a rounded ogival cap, on some airframes carrying a small sensor or fuze dome rather than a seeker window. The rear fuselage tapers into a short cowling around the pusher engine, with the two-blade propeller behind the trailing edge — the opposite of a target drone, which typically mounts its propeller in the nose. The stepped trailing edge and absence of any tail fin distinguish it instantly from a cruise missile (which has a smoother body and often a turbine intake) and from recreational model aircraft (which carry conventional tails and tractor propellers). Finally, the supply chain tells its own story: Ukrainian authorities and investigative journalists cataloguing recovered wreckage have repeatedly documented Western and East Asian microcontrollers, commercial GNSS modules, servos, and off-the-shelf electronic components inside the airframes, evidence that the system is engineered around globally available parts rather than a self-contained national industry — a production logic that prizes volume and low unit cost above resilience to sanctions.

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